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Abstract
We provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is an open set of
utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of Nash equilibria induces a
continuum of outcome distributions.
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1. Introduction
Harsanyi [2] shows that, generically in the space of utilities, a finite normal form game has
a finite (and odd) number of mixed equilibria. Kreps and Wilson [3] note that when the normal
form is derived from an extensive form, Harsanyi’s result has no immediate implications, because
many strategies lead to the same final node. Even if the payoffs at the final nodes can be perturbed
independently, the finiteness of the number of equilibria need not be a generic property; appropriate
counterexamples are easy to construct. Thus, Harsanyi’s result cannot be applied directly to many
economic models of interest.
 This problem was communicated to us by Francesco De Sinopoli.
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For games in extensive form, Kreps and Wilson [3] prove that for generic utility payoffs on
the terminal nodes, the Nash equilibria induce finitely many probability distributions on the same
set of terminal nodes. Based on techniques from the theory of semi-algebraic sets, Govindan and
Wilson [4] provide a more direct proof of the results above, for normal as well as for extensive
form games.
On the other hand, Mas-Colell [1] and later Govindan and McLennan [5] point out that, in
many economic instances, different strategy profiles generate the same outcome; moreover, this
may be true for different terminal nodes of an extensive game. Thus, the same criticism can be
reiterated for the Kreps and Wilson [3] result.
A suitable general setup to address the above problem is obtained with the notion of an outcome
game form, i.e., a mapping from strategy profiles to outcomes. We can now pose the question as
follows: assuming that the utility functions on outcomes may be independently perturbed, is it
true that, generically, the equilibrium strategies of the associated game induce a finite number of
probability distributions on the set of outcomes?
When there are at least three players, Govindan and McLennan [5] provide a negative answer
to the above question. They show an example of a game form with six outcomes where, for an
open set of utility functions, the Nash equilibria induce a continuum of outcome distributions.
On the positive side and for games with any number of players, Govindan and McLennan [5]
prove that if there are only two outcomes, generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions
is restored.
So far, for two person game forms, partial evidence had been obtained that suggested a possible
positive answer to the question above. Mas-Colell [1] shows that the equilibrium payoffs are
generically finite for two player game forms. Govindan and McLennan [6] prove the generic
finiteness of equilibrium distributions on outcomes for zero sum games and common interest
games. González-Pimienta [7] argues that the same result holds for games with two players and
three outcomes.
This note closes the last remaining gap in the case of two players, in a rather unexpected way.
We provide an example of a game form (with four outcomes) and an open set of utility functions
such that in each of the associated games there is a continuum of outcome distributions induced
by Nash equilibria. By introducing dummy players, our example can be extended, in an obvious
way, to any number of players and four outcomes. The results in González-Pimienta [7] and
Govindan and McLennan [5] show that this is the minimum number of outcomes needed for a
counterexample.
2. The conjecture
Let  be a finite outcome space and let S1, S2 denote the finite strategy spaces of each of
the two players. An outcome game form is a mapping  : S1 × S2 → . The utilities of the
players are defined by the functions ui :  → R, i = 1, 2. For each i = 1, 2, let i = { ∈
R
Si++ :
∑
x∈Si (x) = 1}. A pair of strategy vectors pi ∈ i of the players induces a probability
distribution in .
An outcome game form  and the utilities of the players ui , i = 1, 2 determine a bimatrix
game. We denote by A(ui) the associated matrices of utilities of the players in this game. That is,
the entry ajl of A(ui) is ui((sj , sl)). A completely mixed Nash equilibrium in this game consists
of two strategy vectors p1 ∈ 1 and p2 ∈ 2 such that
A(u2)p1 = e for some  ∈ R
and
p2A(u1) = e for some  ∈ R,
where e denotes the vector (in the appropriate Euclidean space) with all of its entries equal to 1.
Conjecture 1. For every bimatrix game form , there is a generic set of utilities in R ×R for
which the set of distributions induced on outcomes by the completely mixed Nash equilibria is
finite.
For the case of two person games, this conjecture corresponds to Conjecture T in Govindan
and McLennan [5]. They disprove the conjecture for games with at least three players.
3. The example
Wenowgive an example that shows that Conjecture 1 does not hold. Let there be four outcomes,
denoted by  = {a, b, c, d}. And consider the outcome matrix
A(a, b, c, d) =
⎛
⎝ c a b bd a a b
c d b c
⎞
⎠ .
Let us use the notation ai = ui(a), bi = ui(b), ci = ui(c), di = ui(d), and ui = (ai, bi, ci, di) ∈
R4 for the utilities of agent i = 1, 2. We denote G = {(u1, u2) ∈ R8 | d1, b1 < a1, c1 and d2 <
b2 < a2, c2}, an open subset in the space of utilities. For each (u1, u2) ∈ G and t ∈ R, we define
p1(u
2) = 1
a2 − b2 + c2 − d2 (b2 − d2, c2 − b2, a2 − b2) ∈ R
3
and
p2(u
1; t) =
(
a1 − b1
a1 − b1 + c1 − d1 −
(a1 − b1)t
a1 − d1 ,
(c1 − b1)t
a1 − d1 ,
c1 − d1
a1 − b1 + c1 − d1 −
(c1 − d1)t
a1 − d1 , t
)
∈ R4.
One checks immediately that the pair 〈p1(u2), p2(u1; t)〉 is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium
provided t is positive and small enough. The probability of outcome a induced by the equilibrium
is computed easily as
pa = (b2 − c2)(c1 − d1)
(a1 − b1 + c1 − d1)(−a2 + b2 − c2 + d2)
+b2(d1 − c1) + b1(c2 − d2) + c1d2 − c2d1
(a1 − d1)(−a2 + b2 − c2 + d2) t.
Therefore, there is a continuum of equilibrium probability distributions (i.e. for t positive and
small enough) on the set of outcomes as long as (u1, u2) ∈ G and b2(d1 − c1) + b1(c2 − d2) +
c1d2 − c2d1 = 0; such values of u1 and u2 form an open subset in the space of utilities. Remark
that when u1 = ±u2, the coefficient of t in the above expression for pa (as well as for the other
outcomes) disappears and there is a unique probability distribution on outcomes, as proved in
Govindan and McLennan [6] and Litan [8].
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